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This essay addresses the relationship that may develop between
Intelligent Vehicle Highway Systems and the comer of privacy law
that includes the Fourth Amendment. As a matter of legal doctrine,
my subject is how the Fourth Amendment may apply to IVHS. As I
argue below, however, neither Fourth Amendment case law nor cur-
rent federal statutes governing privacy and electronic communications
can do our political or moral work for us in deciding how much pri-
vacy we must cede in creating IVHS. The technologies we create
force upon us choices our legal system would rather not view as
choices. Constitutional doctrine and rhetoric purport to deduce legal
rules from an encounter of facts and principles that supposedly dic-
tates results out of a sort of inexorable intellectual logic, but these
deductions or inferences are ultimately choices. In fact, to reverse
perspectives, contemplating how the Fourth Amendment could con-
ceivably govern IVHS may end up telling us a great deal about the
social choices we have buried under the rhetoric of Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence.
Consider drunk-driving roadblocks as a figurative form of "tech-
nology," even without the more advanced electronic surveillance aids
that will soon enhance these roadblocks. Roadblocks enable the po-
lice both to catch criminals and to make the roads safe. At the same
time, they threaten privacy and enhance the possibility of capricious
actions by the police. The constitutional arguments for and against
these roadblocks could well have been written by a computer program
drawing all the rhetorical tropes from previous cases. The result is
some sort of balancing between vaguely invoked Fourth Amendment
privacy rights and vaguely invoked utilitarian demands of law en-
forcement and traffic safety. And in performing this balance, the
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Supreme Court has found a procedural solution: almost any substan-
tive balancing is acceptable if done at a high enough level of govern-
mental authority with sufficient sensitivity to certain key criteria.1
That is, if it is the legislature or high administrative officials
rather than the street police themselves who establish the objective
circumstances for setting up roadblocks and the rules for implement-
ing them, and if the police are given relatively little discretion in con-
struing these rules, then the roadblocks will be legal.2 Choices must
be made about how much danger of drunk drivers in a particular place
must be proved to justify some level of intrusion, or what, if any,
pattern of selecting cars the police must follow, or what, if any, notice
of the roadblocks the public must receive. The Court, however, is
probably more concerned with how and by whom these choices are
made than it is by what the choices ultimately are. Though some of
the balancing criteria we see in relevant cases may seem substantive, it
does not get us very far. All this rhetoric about balancing ultimately
leads to a sort of irreducible, existential judgment call about values: it
is wrong to call it "subjective," but it is equally wrong to call it "com-
pelled" by argument and fact. It is a social choice, and the issue is
how the social choice will be made.
Of course, IVHS will permit the police to do more than just block
roads at selected intersections. Among its many features, what is most
salient here is that IVHS could someday permit the state to know
everywhere you have driven and when-every road you have taken,
every toll you have paid, every gas station you have patronized. With
IVHS, the state may end up knowing more about you than you your-
self have bothered recording or remembering. Indeed, as a Fourth
Amendment matter, IVHS raises the specter of the old infamous Gen-
eral Warrants or Writs of Assistance that inspired enactment of the
Amendment in the first place. But modem Fourth Amendment doc-
trine may end up doing little more than spurring us to note that IVHS
"raises Fourth Amendment concerns," and then we are back to the
square one of making choices.
At square one, we will ask whether the state needs any special
justification to amass all this information or to use it adversely to the
driver or her companions. If there comes a major Fourth Amendment
case about IVHS, it will be important to elucidate the interests or argu-
ments on both sides, and of course good lawyering will require that
this be done not just in terms of abstract principles or rhetorical tropes,
but also with great factual and technical precision in terms of what the
1. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990).
2. Id. at 452-54.
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new technologies will do, offer, and threaten. Yet in some ways the
question will reduce to a procedural one: Who will do the final balanc-
ing? Courts? Congress? Regulators? Police Chiefs? County Super-
visors? How much of the balancing will be implicitly controlled by
the private companies creating the technology-and thereby much of
the vocabulary about the technology that will control the legal
discussion?
A. What the Fourth Amendment Can Do for IVHS
In one sense, the constitutional approach is obvious. IVHS is
about automobiles, and if there is one straightforward thing the
Supreme Court has said about the Fourth Aniendment in this century,
it is that while homes enjoy great protection, automobiles enjoy little.
The cases will remind us that because driving a car necessarily invites
the "pervasive" regulation of the state, drivers must waive a great deal
of privacy to drive;3 moreover, automobiles are major tools of the
criminal trade, and because of their "inherent mobility" the police
must be free of stringent constraints in investigating them.4 Does this
mean that if motorists, at the time they receive drivers' licenses or get
their cars registered, are informed that the state or state agents will
have surveillance power over their cars through electronic devices,
they are theoretically free to reject the privilege? Is this even a fair
question, since most people view driving more as a right or a necessity
than a privilege? And is individual bargaining over this quasi-contrac-
tual waiver possible? Can a driver opt out of some of the benefits of
IVHS in exchange for retaining some of the protections against
intrusion?
The waiver, pervasive regulation, and inherent mobility doctrines
will probably mean that "substantive" Fourth Amendment doctrine
will put little constraint on the designers and users of IVHS. And that
may be just as well, because the better locus of the question is the
legislature or administrative regulation, where "balancing of interests"
can be done more systematically and forthrightly, without the subter-
fuge or shaky intellectual basis we find when courts do the balancing.
In fact, Fourth Amendment law is now a great intellectual morass, so
one should not expect much clear or enlightened legal thinking to bear
on IVHS, even on the crucial question of the capacity of IVHS to
track our movements in cars. On the other hand, many of the IVHS
tools that involve oral communication are probably covered by The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which sets out stringent and
3. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,11 (1977).
4. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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specific rules to control the government's "searches and seizures" of
private electronic communications through wiretaps or other listening
devices.'
B. And What IVHS Can Do for the Fourth Amendment
The irony, however, is that IVHS can contribute a good deal to
Fourth Amendment law, because it can help steer much of our inco-
herent legal doctrine back towards the fundamental issues about the
power of government over privacy. As I will suggest, we need to
return Fourth Amendment law-or supplementary statute law-to
what philosophers call the Rawlsian veil of ignorance-that idealized
condition in which we convene to establish the best rules for our soci-
ety before anyone of us knows whether she personally will turn out to
be the beneficiary or the victim of the rules.' We have to imagine
ourselves-our upstanding good-citizen selves-as possible objects
of police intrusion; we have to decide how much of that we are willing
to accept in exchange for the technological benefits of lVHS; and then
we have to accept the consequence of the protections we demand:
With or without an exclusionary rule, some very bad criminals will go
free.
Fourth Amendment law these days is mostly about cops and rob-
bers, with the cops usually winning. An abstracted doctrinalist-or a
Warren Court idealist-might speak of a strong and elaborate fortress
of rights to be free of warrantless searches and seizures, or at least
from searches and seizures without probable cause, subject to a few
"zealously guarded exceptions" such as exigency, plain view, search
incident to arrest, consent, and so on.7 In fact, a more realistic view is
that though we still pay some rhetorical homage to the broader rights,
the police win most cases.' The exceptions have swallowed much of
the supposedly firm rules, and new exceptions have been added. For
example, much police action is now viewed as a stop-and-frisk under
Terry v. Ohio,9 subject to a lighter reasonable cause requirement; the
exigency, plain view, and search-incident-to-arrest exceptions have
been broadened,'" even a mistaken inference of consent from the
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (1994).
6. See generally JoiN RAwI.S, A TmEoRY or JUS-I=c (1971).
7. See generally CHARLEs WMnMREAD & CsroMrPmR SLoBoaIN, CRIMNA L PROCE.
DuRE 166-217 (1993).
8. See, e.g., Thomas Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn)
About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests,
1982 AM. BAR. FOUND. R-s. J. 611 (suppression motions obstruct prosecution in trivial percent-
age of cases).
9. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10. See generally W~rrEBREAD & S.oBoon .supra note 7.
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wrong person can immunize a search,11 and such old exotica as stand-
ing rules' 2 or such new exotica as the independent source 13 or inevi-
table discovery 4 doctrines make it far more likely that the police can
get their evidence in.
But that is the point-and the problem. Theoretically, the Fourth
Amendment tells government what it can or cannot do, while a sepa-
rate and less important thing called the exclusionary rule determines
when a violation of the Fourth Amendment should deny the prosecu-
tor use of the evidence in a criminal trial. In fact, concern with the
perceived injustices of the exclusionary rule has distorted Fourth
Amendment doctrine and debate. The issue of whether the criminal
should go free because of the blundering constable' 5 has so dominated
the opinions and the scholarship that little attention has been paid to
deeper social and political choices implicit in the Fourth Amendment
itself. The focus is on cases where at least arguably the Fourth
Amendment has been violated, and the issue is always whether the
obviously guilty convict should go free. It would be helpful to shift
our focus to view the Fourth Amendment as protecting rights wholly
independently of the mechanics of criminal justice.
I Unfortunately, Fourth Amendment scholarship is, on the whole, a
bad form of analytic jurisprudence-empty assertions of deontologi-
cal rights theory battling against arid and not very empirically sensi-
tive claims of utilitarianism. In the major cases, and in the
conventional scholarship about the cases, the principles of deontologi-
cal rights and utilitarianism have been expressed in so vague or ill-
grounded a way as to suggest that they are not to be taken seriously-
except as rhetorical gestures. Thus, for example, in the doctrine con-
cerning restrictions on the exclusionary rule, the conservative side of-
fers arguments about cost-benefit analysis and incentives that
recklessly ignore or mis-cite straightforward statistics,' 6 or that rely on
simplistic models of general deterrence that a first-year law student
can easily refute in the analogous case of substantive criminal law. 7
11. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990).,
12. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).
13. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988).
14. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 439 (1984).
15. See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("The criminal is to go free
because the constable has blundered.").
16. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984).
17. Justice White's opinion, like Supreme Court jurisprudence on the exclusionary rule
generally, assumes that there is no point in excluding evidence in cases where the police thought
they were obeying the Fourth Amendment, or for other reasons did not "intend" to violate consti-
tutional norms. This is the standard error about general deterrence introduced by Bentham and
refuted by H.L.A. HART, PumsHmENT AND REspoNsm=rrY 19 (1968).
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Conversely, the liberal side is left haplessly pointing out these
flaws but is trapped by the underlying indeterminacy of the empirical
issues. It tries to escape the trap by attacking the fundamental premise
that cost-benefit analysis is the proper discourse for the debate, point-
ing instead towards normative arguments about what constitutes pri-
vacy and acceptable government behavior, but lacking any confident
alternative vocabulary to make those arguments. Moreover, the liberal
side has never confronted the larger issue hauntingly raised by Earl
Warren himself-that so long as doctrinal debates are driven by con-
cerns over suppression of evidence, they can never address the large
majority of police actions that are utterly unrelated to evidence-gather-
ing but are perhaps much better indicators of the pathology of the
political relationship between people and police.'8
Thus, if the police were to search and seize black males at ran-
dom merely to create social misery, or somewhat less malignly, if they
were to search and seize gang members or prostitutes without reason-
able or probable cause simply to disperse them and deter them from
crime, the Fourth Amendment will prove useless so long as it depends
on the exclusionary rule for enforcement. A recent questionnaire sur-
vey of Chicago's criminal justice system confirms that police are rela-
tively undeterred by the exclusionary rule in high-volume, small-time
drug and other vice cases where they suffer no great cost from dismis-
sal of cases.' 9 We then face the question about the exclusionary rule
so often posed at and ignored by conservatives: Why does not the
objection to the rule logically apply to the amendment itself? If we
look past the exclusionary rule debate, we can see how we have
evaded all serious choices about the constraints and sacrifices we are
willing to -impose on police investigators in the name of privacy be-
cause we have failed to determine what sort of privacy we want and
how much of it we really have to sacrifice. The utilitarian discourse
of deterrence is seductive because it enables judges and scholars to
speak in apparently analytic and determinative terms. By contrast, to
switch from sanctioning questions about the exclusionary rule back to
the underlying Fourth Amendment issues risks either descent into
conventional constitutional arguments about text and meaning-not
18. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1968).
19. Myron W. Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor; An Exclusionary Rule
in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 CoLO. U. L. Ry. 75, 88-89 (1992). One of the most bizarre
instances of the ineffectiveness of the rule is reported by Bradley Canon, The Exclusionary Rule:
Have Critics Proven That It Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JUDicATuRE 398, 403 (1979) (some cor-
rupt Chicago police had high suppression rate because they engaged in deliberately illegal
searches of vice rings run by their friends, ensuring that suppression would kill prosecutions and
enable them to throw public blame on the courts).
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likely to yield much in the Fourth Amendment-or promises treat-
ment of more broadly normative debates about privacy values.
The latter debates in turn risk all the problems now faced by stan-
dard liberal discourse: If we ask what sort of privacy we as society
want, the problem is then identifying a coherent subject "we" outside
the specific contexts of privacy the cases worry over. But it might be
helpful to return to the obvious premise that the Fourth Amendment
itself is in the Constitution and police are supposed to obey it regard-
less of the "technology" of the sanctioning system. Thus, we should
insist, at least to move the thought experiment along, that the debate
be framed in terms of what our private lives owe to the police under
the assumption that the police are intelligently and in good faith obey-
ing the Fourth Amendment. In fact, we should ask, if we owe a debt
to the state, when and how was the debt contract arranged? We might
thereby learn more about the relation between our private lives and
more public duties and associations.2'
Consider the choices that the Court has already made-or, to put
it differently, the choices that have somehow occurred in the name of
constitutional law: Though we imagine intrusions on our privacy as
crossing some sort of categorical boundary, it certainly is a matter of
degree. Many intrusions which we accept or tolerate might appear
unacceptable or intolerable if they were done a little more efficiently
or comprehensively-or perhaps done in mutual coordination. The
state-or sometimes a private party-can discern with whom we cor-
respond by mail," with whom we talk on the phone,22 to whom we
write and from whom we receive checks,23 and so on. Even in a sup-
posedly privileged area-like our medical records or doctor-patient
communications-mail, phone, and banking records might enable an
outsider to construct much of our medical information anyway.24
Though theoretically our home is sacrosanct-if we have one-
anyone who can get high enough over our house can look down and
see what is in the yard,' and unless we make the most elaborate pri-
vate arrangements, someone will see what is in our garbage.26 We
may imagine that no one will use this information in a manner that can
hurt us, and that is largely right-though perhaps more at the grace of
20. See generally STUART ScummicLD, Tim Pomrics OF STR CRinE: CRMHNAL PRO-
CESS AND CULTURAL OBSESSION (1991).
21. United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d. 165, 168 (1978).
22. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 738 (1979).
23. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 438 (1976).
24. Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65
IND. L. J. 549 (1990).
25. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
26. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).
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others than because of any legal restriction. What about calls made to
900 numbers, or cable movies selected?
That is why it is useful to confront a complex new policy issue
that might have to be resolved via contract and legislation, not consti-
tutional rhetoric. To imagine a world without the Fourth Amendment
is to see the moral and political issues cleanly, and to acknowledge
that important privacy interests must be balanced against important
law-enforcement interests.27 But even if we remain within the non-
empirical bounds of doctrine, analytic jurisprudence is incomplete if it
assumes too narrowly and prematurely the nature of the "interests" to
be balanced. Indeed, in the limited terms in which the Supreme Court
speaks, it may be falsely assuming that the "competing interests" can
initially be identified as independent variables.
Here is a helpful example from more conventional Fourth
Amendment law: In Florida v. Bostick,2" the Court held that a person
was not "seized" in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the
police confronted him in his seat in an interstate bus and asked him to
consent to a search of his bags. The Court held that even if the suspect
did not feel free to leave, the constraint came from pre-existing or self-
selected circumstance of his "decision" to get on the bus, and though
the police may have benefited from that constraint, they did not im-
pose it. 9 What is the responsibility of the police in reinforcing or
exploiting social constraints that ease its task? How is this issue re-
lated to such other Fourth Amendment concerns about claimed expec-
tations of privacy at the border of public and private spaces-from
garbage to shared apartments? Does the power of the police depend
on the independent social norms that determine whether an expecta-
tion of privacy at this border is reasonable? In turn, can the legal
inference avoid lowering the reasonable expectation? Do we want
Bostick to assume the risk of entanglement with the state because he
assumed the risk of constraint imposed by the facts of commerce and
social geography? Did he really assume any risks at all, or merely
suffer them?
This line of inquiry need not follow any predisposed path. It may
well lead us to conclude that in some cases people owe the republic a
great deal of selflessness and civic virtue; or that state authority merits
so much respect that the mere display of it (as opposed to the use of
state physical force) should be viewed as a non-coercive call to social
27. Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REv. I
(1991).
28. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
29. Id. at 435-36.
[Vol. 11
THE'LEGACY OF DR. FAUSTUS
duty, not an invasion of a boundary of freedom; or that somewhat
conversely, people feel sufficiently secure from police power that we
can comfortably define expectations of privacy independently of po-
lice power and then incorporate the boundaries by reference into the
definition of legitimate police power. Nor is this inquiry without prac-
tical implications either, since a good argument for the warrant re-
quirement is precisely that judges are good procedural devices for
framing these evaluate trade-offs, especially behind the veil-of-igno-
rance ensured by a pre-search hearing.3" The Fourth Amendment of-
fers us a more public look at these issues than does the confession
arena, since it is in Fourth Amendment law that we have to imagine in
a more collective sense what autonomy and control over our persons,
movements, and property, if not our minds, we reserve as against the
state.
To return to IVHS: Let us imagine that the Los Angeles Police
Department decides to devote, say, one half of its million-dollar-plus
daily budget to an effort to follow one single person-let us call him
O.J. Simpson (and change some of the now-historic facts). Hundreds
of police officers, tens of cars, several police helicopters follow Simp-
son on a freeway. Inevitably, but partly with the active cooperation of
the police, an even larger number of broadcasters, investigators, etc.
from private media business become allies in the effort to track Simp-
son (I avoid the words "search" or "seize"). Now assume that Simp-
son realizes all this as he moves along the highway, and, in a panic,
throws from his truck some piece of clothing that could tie him to a
killing. Or imagine that a police car pulls alongside the truck and an
officer shouts at him, "Where's the weapon?"
Any Fourth Amendment problems? Probably not. Technically,
the police have done "nothing" that amounts to a constitutionally reg-
ulated state action under the Fourth Amendment-certainly they have
stopped short of an arrest. Under recent case law, the police car's
tracking of the Simpson vehicle does not require probable or even
reasonable cause of a crime or criminal activity because the police do
not physically touch Simpson, nor does he surrender to their author-
ity.3 Thus, when Simpson throws out the clothing h6 is freely aban-
doning the clothes to the public sphere where anyone can legally take
them. Similarly, if Simpson says anything incriminating in response
to the question, his statement is perfectly admissible despite the lack
30. Louis M. Seidman & Silas Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional
Theory, 77 Gao. L. J. 19 (1988).
31. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991).
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of a Miranda warning, because he was not under custodial arrest when
questioned.32
All this makes sense if we break this encounter down to tiny
pieces of state action, in each of which the police make only a small
investment in tracking or gathering information from Simpson. Noth-
ing in Fourth Amendment law says that turning that effort into a mas-
sive investment of state and private resources raises any new legal
issues, so long as no formal Fourth Amendment barrier has been
crossed. And IVHS may prove to be the short-cut technological ap-
proach to doing just what this bizarrely plausible hypothetical
imagines the police doing. After all, squadrons of police cars and
helicopters would prove clumsy and costly anachronisms once IVHS
permits the police to track Simpson silently and precisely, and possi-
bly even to detect weapons in his car. Though IVHS may cost many
billions, its economies of scale will essentially enable the police to do
to all of us with insidious efficiency what it did so melodramatically
for my hypothetical Mr. Simpson.
II. FouRTH AMENDMENvrr LAw AND PERIPHERAL SEARCHES
Despite my admonition that IVHS may tell us more about the
Fourth Amendment than vice-versa, I now return to the more conven-
tional premise of this essay-that is, to suggest where IVHS may fit in
with the themes of Fourth Amendment law. Though no one doctrine
or even set of doctrines directly addresses the incursions that IVHS
may make on privacy, there are peripheral areas of Fourth Amend-
ment law that may speak to us at least obliquely about a very border-
line case like IVHS. In a sense, these areas represent the application
of the basic definitions of searches and seizures to "special con-
texts"-outside the conventional arena of direct police investigation
of crime-to which the Fourth Amendment nevertheless must be
applied.
A. "Special" Searches, Where the Prosecutor is an
Afterthought
There are two relevant categories of peripheral Fourth Amend-
ment actions. The first category involves actions in which ostensibly
the police are not investigating criminal conduct but which neverthe-
less do just barely cross the line into stops or searches or seizures; in
these cases, the slight degree of intrusion and-more important-the
ostensibly non-police purpose of the action cause the Court to soften
32. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441 (1984).
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the legal consequences for the state. The second category involves
actions which are unequivocally those of the police seeking to fight
crime, but which, in the Court's view, stop just short of crossing any
Fourth Amendment line. At the risk of blurring the focus on IVHS, I
will briefly review these doctrinal area to give a sense of the constitu-
tional background against which any future IVHS debate may occur.
As for the first category, the "administrative search" is the
broadest example of a "special context" in which the Court is willing
,to relax the normal requirements of probable cause or warrant for
searches. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment mentions criminal prose-
cutions in particular, so presumably any state invasion of privacy can
trigger Fourth Amendment protection. But where the professed pur-
pose of state action is "regulatory" and not "prosecutorial" (a suspi-
cious distinction if there ever was one), the Court may permit an entry
onto private (often business) property either without a warrant or with
a warrant based on something less than probable cause.33 So long as
an administrative agency, such as OSHA or EPA, is acting under some
clear legislative supervision, its inspectors may be able to obtain war-
rants to inspect premises merely as a part of a general inspection of the
premises where regulatory violations may be present (that is, even if
there is no probable cause to believe a crime has occurred).34 Of
course, under a plain view "windfall" approach, whatever they find,
whether it proves* an OSHA violation or a murder case, they may use
whatever the find, even if they enter the premises knowing they might
evidence of a true crime.
Sometimes the Court may even excuse the warrant requirement:
(1) The agency may demonstrate that its inspections can only be effec-
tive if they are complete surprises to the owners of the premises, so it
would be infeasible in any event to present the warrant to the own-
ers;3" (2) if the agency statute itself prescribes some sort of schedule
of inspections, the statute itself might substitute for the warrant;36 (3)
sometimes a court may permit an "area warrant" authorizing searches
of a number of premises of a given sort in a particular region, based on
some vague "reasonable cause" that there may be violations in some
of them.37
One type of "administrative search" that has particularly vexed
the Court is that made by firemen after a suspicious fire. More
broadly, the, administrative search doctrine expands Terry into a gen-
33. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387.U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
34. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
35. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699 (1987).
36. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978).
37. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
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eral jurisprudence of balancing or scale-sliding: the Court will balance
the degree of intrusion and stigma of the state action against the im-
portance of the governmental interest to establish the degree of prob-
able or reasonable cause needed to justify the action and to determine
whether or where a warrant is needed (and of what sort).3"
By far the farthest reaching regulatory/administrative non-indi-
vidualized search procedure ever to be upheld is the warrantless drug
testing of railroad employees and customs agents in Skinner v. Rail-
way Labor Executives Ass'n39 and National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab.4' In both cases, the Court held that the drug test-
ing was indeed a search but that it was legal. The Railway case was
easier (7-2) because it applied to employees involved in certain types
of accidents or who violated specified safety rules, and was carried out
according to elaborate regulations (though the government did not ob-
tain individual warrants). The Court held that the regulations provided
certainty and uniformity so that no warrant was needed, and that the
government had an interest in testing employees that overbalanced the
usual requirements of individualized suspicion. The scheme was a
reasonable effort to ensure safety and was not a pretext for criminal
investigation.
Von Raab was more troublesome (5-4) because the individuals
tested were merely those seeking transfer or promotion to positions
involving drug enforcement or the use of firearms. Almost by defini-
tion, these were employees who could otherwise establish their clean
records in the customs service, so that they were precisely not the
individuals who merited individualized suspicion.41  (Under this
scheme, the test results could not be used in a criminal prosecution
without the person's consent.) Justices Stevens and Scalia joined Jus-
tices Marshall and Brennan in dissent, because in their view "neither
frequency of use nor connection to harm is demonstrated or even
likely."42
New Jersey v. T.L.O4' treats searches of high school students and
some of their effects essentially like administrative searches. A
teacher told a principal that a 14-year old was smoking cigarettes in a
lavatory. Upon the student's denial, the principal searched the stu-
dent's purse and found marijuana inside. At least where the state
agent is a school official and not a police officer, she may search with-
38. See e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
39. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
40. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
41. Id. at 682 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42. l at 681 (Scalia, I, dissenting).
43. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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out a warrant and with only vaguely reasonable cause. The Court did
not clarify when the school officials or police could search lockers or
desks. In O'Connor v. Ortega" the Court rejected the argument that
governmental employees can never have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their workplaces. There was no majority opinion on the
specific legality of a warrantless search of government psychiatrist's
offices, desk, and files, where the search was by supervisors investi-
gating violations of workplace rules, not police officers investigating
crimes. A plurality said the search required reasonable cause but not
probable cause or a warrant.
To return to the vehicular world of drunk-driver roadblocks,
these constitute a special context where the state cannot really rely on
an "administrative search" rationale, because the purpose is unques-
tionably to investigate crime. Instead, the courts have simply said that
the extreme public exigency of the drunk driving problem, combined
with the difficulty of apprehending drunk drivers, requires that the
states have broad powers to stop cars on vague suspicions, rather than
probable cause. (They do sometimes throw in a bit of an administra-
tive rationale, suggesting that because of the "pervasive regulation" of
cars and drivers of which all are aware, there is a bit of waiver the
moment you get in your car.)
The background to the whole issue is the case of Delaware v.
Prouse,45 which essentially said that -the stop of a' car is a Fourth
Amendment seizure-at least a Terry stop-sb that some sort of indi-
vidualized suspicion is necessary. That is pretty easy to obtain, since
most drivers are always a little over the speed limit or tend to slide
over the yellow line, but a decade or so ago the states began trying to
assert greater power to set up roadblocks or checkpoints in high-risk
areas. Here we have a funny sort of jurisprudential dilemma. Nor-
mally we require proof of individualized suspicion before permitting a
seizure because otherwise state action may be random and arbitrary.46
But the states argued that if we make auto stops truly and design-
edly "random" (i.e., we stop every car) then we eliminate the danger
of discriminatory or capricious selection of drivers.47 In effect, we
limit police discretion to stop cars at their whim by requiring them to
stop even those cars they do not want to stop. This can entail stopping
absolutely all cars, or cars chosen according to a deliberately mechani-
cal formula-every third or tenth car, etc. Thus, the police will stop
44. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
45. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
46. See e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
47. See Michigan, supra note 1, at 447.
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all or many cars at a roadblock, briefly talk to the driver, sniff for
alcohol, etc. The system authorizes the stop, but the police cannot
look in the car or engage in any more invasive search or seizure unless
the plain view or smell at the stop produces further evidence."a If they
find further evidence a fully Terry stop and frisk or an arrest can then
proceed.49
After years of confusing litigation, the Court in Michigan Dept.
of State Police v. Sitz50 approved a roadblock scheme which stopped
all drivers; was set up in a safe location, caused minimum inconven-
ience for the driver, imposed on police clear and neutral rules as to
how to treat all drivers, and left the police minimal or no discretion
over whom to stop.51 The Court faulted the lower court decision for
its excessively critical inquiry of the effectiveness of sobriety
checkpoints.52
If it needs the help, the government could certainly use the ad-
ministrative search doctrines to support the wide and fairly unre-
strained use of IVHS. After all, when we register our cars and license
ourselves, we invite the administrative state to monitoring our driving
skill, test our cars for pollution and accident dangers, and tax us for
our use of roads and bridges. IVHS obviously vastly enhances the
power of the state to do these regulatory jobs, but they will remain, at
least in iheory, merely "regulatory" jobs-indeed, regulatory jobs that
supplement the exciting variety of "consumer services" that IVHS
supposedly promises drivers. Indeed, when it comes to safety and
traffic management, regulation and consumer service become hard to
distinguish. And so long as these-and not criminal law enforce-
ment-remain the originating purposes of IVHS, the state may retain
the broad powers associated with administrative searches. Of course,
those suspicious of professedly benign state power may question the
premise that the advertised benefits of IVHS are the originating prem-
ise, or that it is even meaningful to speak of an originating premise for
a technology whose malign potential may evolve regardless of the in-
tentions of its designers; But arguments of that sort may be moot in
the world of the administrative state already embraced by Fourth
Amendment doctrine.
. One other "special context" merits attention-the national bor-




51. Id. at 454.
52. Ia at 453.
[Vol. 11
THE LEGACY OF DR. FAUSTUS
1. At fixed checkpoints at an actual border or its "functional
equivalent" (that is, the confluence of two main roads right near the
border), the government has virtually unrestrained power to search
people and cars without a warrant, without probable cause, and with-
out any individualized reasonable suspicion. 3 That is why, for exam-
ple, customs officials at airports can search all travelers and their
belongings without any individual justification. It is as if the immi-
gration-control power is a special, categorical exigency. Or, one
might say, the traveler always has the theoretical alternative of turning
back. (By analogy, given the categorical exigency of hijacking, air-
ports can search all passengers with metal detectors.) In the border
case, that means that at the border itself, the officers can stop all cars,
briefly look at and question passengers (who, of course, retain the
privilege against self-incrimination) and look virtually everywhere in
the car.
2. The government may set up fixed checkpoints some distance
from the border where undocumented aliens are alleged to pass in
some numbers. Here state power is somewhat weaker. Though the
case law is a bit unclear, the best analogy would be to the drunk-
driving roadblock. The government can probably stop all cars or
every third car, etc., at such a checkpoint. 54 Then, if the initial en-
counter creates any further suspicion, the officers can proceed to a full
Terry encounter or, where appropriate, an arrest. It is unclear exactly
where such a checkpoint can be set up.
3. A temporary checkpoint near the border (i.e., a police or INS
car just stops at a roadside) or "roving patrols" is different still. This
is essentially a regular Terry stop requiring regular Terry justification.
The police may stop the car based on some individualized reasonable
suspicion. The problem, of course, is that the suspicion may implic-
itly (sometimes explicitly) be based on nothing more than the presence
of several Latino-appearing people crowded into an old car at night.55
Despite obvious concerns that border searches can prove useful
for racially prejudiced state action, the Supreme Court's predictable
invocation of the special federal power over immigration and the dif-
ficulty of policing porous borders -these tend to be constitutional
trump cards. But it is the fluid definition of "border" that may be most
significant for the future of IVHS. Under recent cases, the "border"
has effectively become any place where the police reasonably suspect
concentrated movements of undocumented immigrants-even, that is,
53. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 564 (1976).
54. Id. at 559.
55. See e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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in a factory in a big city." If so, all the more easily the "border" may
become whatever route a car may follow to evade immigration offi-
cials. Whether IVHS technology will permit especially enhanced
scrutiny of the movements or indeed the insides of cars-and possibly
the appearance or languages or accents of its occupants-may be
something a constitutional lawyer should worry about.
B. When a Search is Not a Search After All
The second category of peripheral searches or seizures is state
action which turns out not to be a search or seizure at all. Unlike the
administrative search approach, this approach to the intrusion of IVHS
on our privacy questions not whether the intrusion is fair or necessary
but whether, in a legal sense it is an intrusion in the first place. Here
is a brief survey of the terrain:
The Court upheld warrantless inspections of and seizures from
personal trash in California v. Greenwood," where the police made
arrangements with a neighborhood trash collector to turn over all of
Greenwood's trash left on the public street. The Court said that this is
not a Fourth Amendment intrusion at all, since the owner abandons
any reasonable expectation of privacy when he deposits the trash
outside his home for collection. The majority noted that the suspect
had made it possible for any person or animal to open the opaque
bags; the dissent argued that the state action nevertheless violated civi-
lized standards of conduct; as for the abandonment issue, the dissent
noted that Katz v. United States58 forbids warrantless wiretaps even
though a telephone operator could illicitly listen in on your
conversations.
The space within which you have a Fourth Amendment expecta-
tion of privacy is often smaller than the space containing your state
law property (and privacy) rights. Thus, if you own a 20-acre estate,
the police may be able to look into a suspected marijuana garden 200
yards from your house without involving Fourth Amendment law at
all. The police may have technically "trespassed" on your rights
under state law, but you do not have any constitutional privacy right in
"public" or visible private places.59 The same goes for an aerial sur-
vey of your land or open fields. Needless to say, there is a fuzzy
border between your home and open fields.
56. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
57. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
58. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
59. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
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In California v. Ciraolo6 ° and Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States,61 the Court greatly expanded police "overflight" power, hold-
ing that vertical inspections are rarely searches in the Fourth Amend-
ment sense. Then in Florida v. Riley,62 a plurality of the Court said
that helicopter searches, which are more intrusive, are still outside the
Fourth Amendment. (Here the copter hovered 400 feet above a partly
open greenhouse in public airspace in a position from which a fixed
wing aircraft would itself have gotten a good view. and no damage
occurred to the property). Ironically though, if it may be that if you
stand in your open field and shoo the police away, they may have to
leave. The Fourth Amendment may come into play when the police
search a place outside your house, but in some very private nearby
spot (like bushes or under eaves) the Court may call "curtilage."63 A
related question that gets fact-specific is whether a search warrant
mentioning your house or "premises" covers outbuildings like garages
or sheds.
Here is an easy one: There is essentially no right of privacy in
prison or jail cells, so no warrant or any probable or even reasonable
cause must be individually demonstrated to permit officials to inspect
anywhere in the cells for whatever they wish to look for.' The Court
has also held that probationers are also subject to warrantless searches
without probable cause; the holding would surely apply to parolees as
well. 65
But to approach more directly whether IVHS, especially in its
power over oral communication, may cross a constitutional line, we
must start with the famous case of Katz v. United States. Katz held
illegal a warrantless tap of a phone conversation in a phone booth,
thus opening up the whole issue of what constitutes a "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy." Katz overruled, among other cases, the famous
Olmstead decision of the late 1920's in which Brandeis wrote a classic
dissent about "the right to be let alone," 66 and made it clear that the
police could violate the Fourth Amendment by an intrusion that did
not include an actual physical invasion of private property or space.
(The old cases had tended to invalidate police eavesdropping where
the technology had involved, say, a spike-mike pushed through the
suspect's wall, but not a mike stuck to the wall of the adjoining apart-
60. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
61. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
62. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
63. Oliver, 466 U.S., at 180.
64. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
65. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
66. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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ment.) There is some complicated law about other means of getting
information from private conversations. Normally, if a police under-
cover agent tricks you into talking to him it's a risk you take (putting
aside self-incrimination issues), and his reporting of the conversation
does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even if the conversation is in
your house, so long as you "voluntarily" let him in.67 The same is true
if you let the undercover agent in and he is wired, so the police get a
recording of the conversation. 8
In any event, where no party to the conversation has consented to
the eavesdropping, the eavesdropping would violate Katz unless a
warrant based on probable cause were obtained. This matter is now
heavily regulated by subconstitutional state and federal statutes like
the 1968 Wiretap Act (Title 111)69 and the 1986 Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act,70 that normally require a kind of super-probable
cause, pre-wiretap court approval, rigid restrictions on the duration of
the tap, and regular reports to and oversight by the authorizing judge.
In this regard, IVHS may raise no new issues: If the system obviously
records what drivers say, then the driver can hardly complain that the
state can overhear him, and any passenger may have to take his friend
as he trusts him. If IVHS systems make it easier for the state to wire-
tap a car phone without the driver's consent, that will presumably re-
main a wiretap under Katz. If the driver or passenger complains that
the tracking or instrument reading tools of the system record informa-
tion from which conversation can be inferred by its behavioral mani-
festations, they will have made a nice academic point of little legal
constitutional significance.
I. IT IS ANYTIME OF DAY: Do You KNow WHERE YouR
CITIZENS ARE?
Now to get to the most relevant doctrine: electronic surveillance
of automotive movement. The current rules seem to work as follows:
(1) assume a police undercover agent, or private party cooperating
with the police, gives the suspect some sort of container to be used for
drugs. It is not a Fourth Amendment intrusion for the police to put a
tracing beeper in the container when it is given to the suspect'-no
warrant or proof of probable cause or even reasonable cause is
67. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
68. There is also a standing issue here. If the police violate Katz by intercepting a purely
private conversation between A and B, A and B can both raise a Fourth Amendment claim. And
if A and B have this conversation in the home of C, C has standing to object too, even if she was
not a party to the conversation.
69. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1994).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (1994).
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needed.71 It is also not a Fourth Amendment intrusion if the police
then rely on a response from the beeper to trace the suspect's move-
ments on public highways. The Court says the beeper merely magni-
fies and enhances what is theoretically in plain public view anyway.
However, it is a Fourth Amendment intrusion to rely on the beeper to
determine that the container which was "observed" entering the home
remains in the home; that inference could only be drawn if the sending
of the beeper into the house were treated as a search and based on a
warrant.72 (2) It is not a Fourth Amendment intrusion for the police
to put the beeper on the outside or under the bumper of an unsuspect-
ing suspect's car to trace the car's movement, but the police would
need a warrant to place a beeper inside the car.73
In United States v. Knotts,74 federal agents placed a tracking
beeper in a container of chloroform housed in a store, with the store-
owner's consent. The container was picked up by Petschen, who put
it in his car.75 The police lost visual track of Petschen but used the
beeper to trace him to Knotts's cabin.76 After visual surveillance, the
agents then got a warrant, executed it, and found a drug laboratory in
the house.
77
The key to the decision affirming the conviction was that Pet-
schen's car had traveled a public thoroughfare. He thereby accepted
the reasonable risk that anyone, including the police, could follow him
at a non-intrusive distance and watch where he was going. The beeper
merely augmented the ability of the agents' naked eyes.78 Indeed, had
the agents placed the beeper on the exterior underside of the car with-
out Petschen's knowledge or consent, the case would have been the
same: cars themselves receive little Fourth Amendment protection an-
yway.7 9 Such old notions as the "inherent mobility" of the car give
police far more leeway than they have with residences, and the "per-
vasive regulation" of the automobile that we all accept for the "privi-
lege" of driving means that we cannot claim a right of privacy, at least
in the exterior. If we want to enjoy the benefits of public commerce,
we cannot at the same time retain the otherwise privileged boundaries
of private life.
71. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
72. Id. at 714-15.
73. See, e.g., cases cited in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 279 n.1 (1983).
74. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
75. Id. at 278.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 279.
78. Id. at 282-83.
79. See note 73.
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In United States v. Karo,80 agents placed a beeper in a can of
ether. Undetected by the police visually, the can was moved to other
locations. The police might have lost track of the can had it not been
for the beeper."' Agents saw Karo pick up ether at informant's house
and then followed Karo home. 2 It then traced the movement of the
can through several other houses and storage facilities, though smell,
sight, and the aid of the facilities' owners aided them in confirming
the location of the can. The can was finally traced to a home. Karo
fleshed out what Knotts had implied: Not only may the government
freely track the beeper on a public highway, in addition, if the original
possessor of the can consents to the beeper's placement in the can, the
unwitting receiver of the can cannot complain that the beeper has been
tracking him without his realizing it. All Karo concedes, is that the
magic constitutional line is the outside of the suspect's house: only
when the beeper enters the house does it raise Fourth Amendment
issues.83
These cases obviously offer little comfort to opponents of IVHS
who hope that car tracking requires Fourth Amendment regulation. So
long as IVHS is about cars and not homes, there will be little but the
moral wisdom of the police to constrain state action. What about pas-
sengers? In Ybarra v. Illinois," the Supreme Court held that a war-
rant to search a particularized place does not necessarily permit the
police to search everyone in that place. Will everyone in a car be
implicated by the suspicious conduct of the driver? Ybarra may be a
powerful tool of civil liberties, but it applies when the police have
made a search under a warrant, and it will be irrelevant if what IVHS
accomplishes does not even amount to a search. If passengers in a car
claim unfair surprise that the police follow their own movements-
and even hear their conversations-the courts may have little trouble
saying that the passenger consents to the tracking and runs the risk of
the overhearing, by trusting the driver of a car.
Electronic surveillance does raise some significant Fourth
Amendment concerns.85 One is secrecy. A conventional police intru-
sion is likely to be boisterous or visible enough to give the individual
notice, at least as of the moment of the search, of the police action.
Such notice is not any formal requirement of the Fourth Amend-
80. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
81. Id. at 708-9.
82. Id. at 708.
83. 468 U.S. at 714-15.
84. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
85. David Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MmN. L. Rnv. 563
(1990).
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ment-it is just a logically pragmatic adjunct of a conventional search
(though some lower-court cases suggest that the Fourth Amendment
should require more stringent criteria for a warrant in the case of se-
cret searches)., 6 By contrast, traditional electronic surveillance is al-
most always, by definition, unknown to the individual while or after it
happens. This may seem intuitively unfair; moreover, secrecy reduces
the suspect's ability to gather the facts on which he can retroactively
challenge the intrusion. In addition, it isolates the search from the
kind of public political accountability that keeps the system honest,
and it raises the risk of excessively inhibiting certain legal associa-
tional or free speech activities by creating fear of the unperceivable
intrusion.
The police may use IVHS simply as a technological short-cut to
the kind of beeper-tracing now done under the rules described above.
In that sense, IVHS raises the same sort of "secret search" concerns as
wiretapping. On the other hand, if motorists are all vaguely or gener-
ally aware that the police can follow their movements all the time-
that is, if they have "consented" to IVHS-then the police are not
exactly acting secretly. This may, however, create an insidious but
lulling sense of uncertainty as to who is being followed at any one
time, and for what purpose, and cause the public to fear or disdain the
police.
The history of statutory restrictions on electronic surveillance
may prove a better reason for optimism than all this talk of the Fourth
Amendment. Title In-the so-called Wiretap Act of 1968-properly
responded to the Katz decision by removing from judicial fussing the
criteria for and scope of legal wiretaps. The special, tailored rules of
probable cause, specificity, duration, and redaction have been success-
ful enough that-remarkably enough-they rarely arise in court at all.
Though criticized as much as praised, Title III's only very fundamen-
tal flaw was one that only time would determine and future legislation
could cure-its failure to apply to more novel, non-wire, and non-
aural forms of communication.87
The 1986 ECPA filled many of those gaps, and its legislative
success may have been a good example of social choice in the right
arena: A remarkable convergence of government, commercial, and
civil liberties parties actually agreed on a rule.88 Crucial to this may
have been the role of the business interests who manufacture and ser-
86. John Kent Walker, Note, Covert Searches, 39 STA. L. Rnv. 545 (1987).
87. Robert Kastenmeier, Deborah Leavy & David Beier, Communications Privacy: A Leg-
islative Perspective, 1989 Wisc. L. Ray. 715, 719.
88. See generally id
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vice the new technologies, and whose economic interest in pleasing
their ultimate consumers may have trumped any loyalty to the per-
ceived ideological bent of the government. In theory, at least, if con-
sumers have some say in the technology of surveillance, business may
prove to be as much the agent of the public as of the government, and
market interests can drive business to help establish appropriate re-
strictions on governmental power.
But let me conclude, by returning for a moment to Chief Justice
Rehnquist's language in Knotts:
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place
to another. When Petschen traveled over the public streets he vol-
untarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he
was traveling over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact
of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination
when he exited from the public roads onto private property. 89
So the deeper question is what price we are willing to pay for the
advantages of efficiency, especially where, as in IVHS, the advantages
accrue not only, or even primarily, to law enforcement and thereby to
the public only indirectly. Somewhat pregnantly, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist cautiously notes that Knotts did not present the question of 24-
hour dragnet surveillance. Perhaps IVHS does. The Chief Justice
speaks here with a certain world-weary deductive tone: This is all just
about cars on public roads; the "rules of the road" are there, and en-
hanced police efficiency is not the same thing as unconstitutionality.
The challenge is to move from these logically technical legal deduc-
tions to some more fundamental claim that IVHS will help the state
know everything about us-that it will become, in effect, a universal
general warrant executed with Star Wars hardware and software. This
will require more than constitutional litigation or even open-minded
"policy" discussion. It will require that a society choose how private
it wants to be.
89. 460 U.S. at 281-82.
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